Article. 11 - Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?

Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of God have , for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has cannot lose it.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, " which can fail was never true." [*The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no at all. Therefore, when once we have , we cannot lose it.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not ." Now no man loses by doing great things. Therefore if be there, it cannot be lost.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now excludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore cannot be lost.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first ."

I answer that, The dwells in us by , as shown above (A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider in three ways: first on the part of the , Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect is incompatible with sin through the power of the , Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time---that the should will to move a certain man to an act of , and that this man, by sinning, should lose . For the gift of is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his book on the of the (De Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby is lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the , by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

Reply to Objection 2: The which can fail by reason of itself is no true ; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of included in its act, this is not contrary to true .

Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to ; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

Reply to Objection 4: by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose .