Robert South · 24 of 26

The certainty of a judgment after this life. · Part 1

A SERMON

PREACHED AT ST. MARY’S, OXON.

2 COR. v. 10.

We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.

BESIDES instruction and exhortation, which have never been wanting (at least in this last age) to those of this church, there are but two ways or means more, in the ordinary course of divine Providence, by which the reasonable creature is to be wrought upon; I mean, by which man is either to be taken off from the forbidden evil he is inclined to, or drawn to the commanded good he is averse from; and those two are, the hope of a reward for one, and the fear of punishment for the other; that those who have neither ingenuity nor gratitude, nor will be allured to piety and obedience by the fruition of God’s mercies, may yet, out of a self-love at least, and impatience of suffering, be frighted from disobedience and profaneness by feeling of God’s judgments. And truly, if we of this nation had been so ingenuous and well-natured a people as that the former of these (I mean God’s mercies) would have prevailed with us, we had long since been inwardly the best, as we were outwardly the happiest, of all nations. For never was there any people, since the creation of mankind, that enjoyed, for so long time together, so many of God’s mercies of all kinds and degrees, and that with so many aggravating circumstances to improve and endear them to us, as we did, whilst, for almost a century together, God courted us and wooed us, as it were, without interruption or inter mission, by word and deed, by peace and plenty, and by all sorts both of temporal and spiritual expressions of his love, which were possible for a Creator to make to a creature: so that what God said once to the church and nation of the Jews, he might have said unto us not long since, Isaiah v. 4, viz. What could I have done more unto my vineyard? What could I have done more, in love and kindness to the church of England, than I have done? Why should you be used kindly any more? You will revolt more, you will but abuse my goodness, and weary my patience, and turn my grace into wantonness, as much or more hereafter than you have done already. And therefore God having, according to his usual method, first, and so long, tried all fair means to win us and keep us to him, and all in vain, (most of us still growing the worse the better we were used by him,) he was compelled at last, (after many warnings and threatenings to no purpose,) he was compelled, I say, (for he delights not in the affliction of any creature,) to make use of his other, and that which is usually his most effectual, way of working upon man, I mean, the way of his judgments; and that, first, by taking away all his blessings, which we had so long and so unthankfully abused; and secondly, by making us feel, what we would not fear, the power and effects of his wrath, which we had before so often and so long provoked and despised; so that the measure of the afflictions we lately suffered, though it will still fall short of the measure of our sins, yet is it correspondent, in many respects, to the measure of that happiness we formerly enjoyed; our peace being turned into war, our plenty into scarcity, our health into sickness, our strength into weakness, our religion into hypocrisy on the one side, and profaneness on the other; and we ourselves, who before had nothing almost to wish for, had, in those times, nothing almost that we could hope for, being then the object of scorn or pity, who were before the object of envy and admiration to all our neighbouring kingdoms. And now one would believe the dismal account of those times, which our own sins brought upon us, should have some good effect on our lives and conversations; one would think, I say, that, if our foreheads were not of brass, our necks iron, and our hearts adamant, we should either have been bended or broken with these sufferings; and that the bitterness of our punishment would by this time have so far exceeded the sweetness of our sins, that we should willingly have quitted the one, upon condition we might have been (as certainly we should have been) delivered from the other. But alas! such is commonly either the blindness of our minds, the hardness of our hearts, or the searedness of our consciences, or rather the spiritual lethargy (as I may so term it) of our souls, that most of us sleep in as great security in the midst of all manner of judgments, as Jonas did in the midst of that storm which his own disobedience had raised. Or if perhaps we are awake with our eyes, yet our hearts, as Nabal’s was, are dead within us. So that to all our other miseries this plague, which is the greatest any man can have in this world, is added also; I mean, that seeing, we should not see; and hearing, we should not hear; and understanding, we should not perceive; nay, that even feeling, we should not feel, or at least not feel what most hurts us, or what indeed was, is, and will be, the true and only cause of our sufferings. Whence it comes to pass, that very few of us are, like David, the better, but many thousands of us, like Ahaz, the worse, since we were afflicted; having, like the ground, often drank up both the former and latter rain; the former of God’s mercies, and the latter of his judgments; and yet bring forth nothing but briers and thorns, nothing but hypocrisy and profaneness; and consequently must needs be (as the ground was) nigh unto cursing, and I pray God our end be not burning: For to men so heavily plagued, and yet for all that so incorrigibly wicked, as many of us are, what remains but (as St. Paul tells us) a fearful expectation of judgment? And by judgment he means not any temporal or worldly judgment, but the conclusion, or rather consummation, of all our miseries here, with hell and damnation itself hereafter. And indeed it is the fearful expectation of that future judgment, or nothing, that must work upon obstinate offenders. The truth is, our spiritual lethargy is not curable but by a spiritual fever, and it must be the horror of an awakened and affrighted conscience that must melt and mollify the hardness of our hearts. And therefore have I made choice of this argument to discourse on at this time, as being persuaded that, if any thing at all will humble us, it must be the apprehension of and meditation on the last judgment; and this, I hope, by God’s blessing, may be effectual in some measure to this purpose; for surely no man can be so fast asleep in his sins, but the sounding of the last trumpet in his ears may startle him; neither can any man be running so fast or so furiously in the broad way that leadeth to destruction, but the flashing of hell-fire in his face may put him to a stand. And therefore let all profane persons or hypocrites, that live in any known sin or evil course of life, attend with fear and trembling to this most terrible and yet most infallible oracle of the great God. For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.

These words I shall not now consider (as they may be) as matter of consolation to the righteous; but only, upon this occasion, handle them in the severer sense, or that of terror only: and from these words thus considered I shall endeavour, (waving all needless criticisms,)

1st, To convince every man’s conscience that there shall be indeed such an appearance, or such a general trial or doom of all mankind after this life, as is here spoken of.

2dly, I shall try to make clear to every one of our understandings what manner of appearance, or trial, this shall be; as also before whom, and in what form of proceeding, together with the issue, effects, and consequences of it.

3dly and lastly, I will, by way of application, do my best endeavour to work upon every man’s affections, by shewing you how much all men, (of what quality and condition soever they are,) especially the wicked and ungodly, are concerned in it; and consequently how much it imports all men, especially such men, to think upon it and prepare for it, that, by a timely repentance, they may prevent the woful effects of it. To begin then with the

First of these general heads, in which I am to convince every man’s conscience that there shall be indeed such an appearance, or such a general trial or doom of all mankind, after this life, as is here spoken of; neither let any man think this purpose unnecessary or superfluous, as if it supposed a doubt, where none was, by making a question of a principle; for though the affirmative of this proposition (viz. that there shall be certainly such a doom or judgment after this life) be, or ought to be, a principle undeniable, indisputable, and consequently unquestionable, amongst such as are truly Christians, yet because, as St. Paul says of the Jews, all are not Jews that are Jews outwardly, so may I say too, that all are not Christians neither that are so outwardly; and because many pretend to be of the church that hardly believe all the articles of her Creed; lastly, because there are some amongst us that do not only live, but talk, as if they thought there were no account to be given of their sayings or doings after this life, or at least as if they either doubted or had forgotten this truth: for the satisfaction of all it is therefore expedient to rescue from disbelief and contempt this fundamental article of our Creed, viz. that Christ shall come again to judge both the quick and the dead. For proof of this proposition against such as deny it, I desire only this fair postulatum, the acknowledgment of that truth, which is ordinarily acquirable by the light of nature herself, viz. that there is a God, or such a power as made us, and observes our actions; and granting this conclusion, I question not but to make it appear even to the most profane persons, and that from the dictates of their own reason, together with such notions as they have or may have of the Deity by the light of nature itself, that there shall be a trial or judgment of all men after this life, for the things that all and every one of them have done here. in the flesh, and that,

1st, Because it is very agreeable to the nature of God.

2dly, Because it is also very consonant to the nature of the soul of man.

3dly, Because it is necessary for the manifestation of the divine justice.

4thly, Because the inequality and disproportion between actions and events; merits and rewards, men’s parts and their fortunes here in this life, doth seem to require and exact such a judgment.

5thly, Because there is an inbred notion, or natural instinct and apprehension in all men, that there will be such a judgment.

And 1st, The truth of this doctrine is very applicable to the nature of God; for what can be more agreeable to the nature of the most pure and powerful agent, than to draw and unite unto itself whatsoever is like itself, as likewise to separate and remove from itself whatsoever is unlike itself? Now what is like God, but that which is good? and what unliker him than evil? And what is it to unite the one to himself, but to reward? or to separate and remove the other, but to punish? And yet we see God neither rewards all the good, nor punishes all the wicked in this world: there must be therefore a time hereafter, when both the one and the other shall be performed, and that time is what I call the last judgment.

2dly, The truth of this doctrine is very agreeable to the nature of the soul of man, because otherwise the chief agent both in good and evil should have little or no reward for the one, and little or no punishment for the other. For the principal or chief agent in all our actions (whether they be good or bad) is the soul; the body is but an organized instrument, or at most but an accessary in either. And yet all rewards and punishments appointed for good and evil by laws in this life, are bodily and sensual, at least I am sure they are finite, and mortal, and consequently no way suitable or proportionable to the spiritual, immaterial, and immortal nature of the soul. That therefore the chief agent or principal in all actions may have its reward or punishment proportionable and adequate to its own nature, it is necessary that at one time or other there should be an inquisition and judgment, whose effects, whether good or bad, may be spiritual and everlasting. Now if a judgment producing such effects cannot be here in this life, it must therefore necessarily be in another hereafter.

3dly, It is not only requisite, but necessary, that there should be a judgment after this life for the manifestation of the divine justice: for though whatsoever God doth is just, and that because God does it, yet does it not always appear to be so. Now God is not only just in himself, but will appear to be so to others, and will have his justice confessed and acknowledged, at one time or other, by the hearts and consciences of all men. And though the Creator is not obliged to account to the creature for the manner how, or the reason why, he doth any thing; yet if he will have the creature convinced of a thing, that it is so or so, he must needs some way or other, or at some time or other, make it appear to the creature that it is so; and therefore I say for this reason it is necessary, that at some time or other there should be a general, a public, and a formal trial, wherein the actions of every particular man should be discovered to all in general, both angels and men; that so the actions being compared with the issue, and the merit balanced with the reward, God might (as the apostle says, Rom. iii. 4.) be justified when he judgeth, whether he absolves or condemns, and that not only by those that stand by, and are but the hearers of it, but even by those themselves that are judged. One of the main ends therefore, (as I humbly conceive,) why God hath appointed a day to judge all the world, (as the apostle speaks, Acts xvii. 31,) is, to give the whole world satisfaction, or to convince men and angels, whether they be good or bad, of the exact and precise integrity and impartiality of the divine justice in all and every one of the acts and effects of it. And hence it is, that this general doom is called in scripture, the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God; or the day wherein God will reveal and make it appear, that all his ways and all his judgments are righteous: though the very being of a God implies holiness and power, and consequently justice, yet the ways and means God makes use of to shew that infinite justice are not always obvious; though we know by his nature it is impossible for him to be unjust, yet are there some things, in which, though we search ever so diligently for the manner how they come to pass; yet I am apt to believe them beyond the capacity of human nature, and the measure even of divine revelation on this side the grave; for example, that for the offence of one, condemnation came upon all men, or that all men became liable to eternal wrath, because one man had eaten the forbidden fruit, is what we ought to deem exact truth, as consonant to express scripture; that the misery of all for the sin of one would be a most just punishment, if God should inflict it; but then we may believe likewise, that the reasons of God’s justice in both these particulars are superior to the comprehension of mortality, and not now fathomable. The like may be said in regard of the punishment of finite and temporal sin with infinite and eternal torment; which though it be true, that it shall be so, and consequently just that it should be so; yet I believe it would perplex the wisest man living to give a satisfactory answer (according to our notions of equity and justice) how in equity or justice it can be so. And therefore in regard of these, and such other δυσνόητα, or hard truths as these are, it is, that St. Paul, (though bred at the feet of Gamaliel, and wrapt up into the third heaven, and consequently knowing as much or more of God than ever man did,) cries out, as one overwhelmed in admiration and astonishment, Rom. xi. 33, O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! But at the day of judgment, the reason and equity even of these, and of all other now seeming hard sayings, shall be disclosed to us, that the righteousness of all God’s ways, and the impartiality of his dealings with the sons of men, may be so clearly manifested to all, that the very reprobates themselves shall be forced to see and acknowledge their own damnation to be most just, both in regard to the duration and intenseness of it, having not so much as the comfort of an excuse, nor any thing to accuse or complain of, but their own folly and fault for their destruction. And thus you see, in the third place, the necessity of a judgment after this life, for the satisfaction of the world, for the conviction of the wicked, and consequently for the full and perfect manifestation of the divine justice.

4thly, The strange disproportion and unsuitableness betwixt actions and events, merits and rewards, men’s parts and their fortune here in this life, doth seem to exact, as it were, at the hands of a righteous God, that there should be a day of an after-reckoning, to rectify this, which is in appearance so great a disorder and confusion: and to put a real and a visible difference betwixt the evil and the good, the holy and the profane; for now there seems to be none at all, it being long since the observation of one of the wisest of men, Ecclesiastes ix. 2, That all things happen alike unto all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. Nay it were well, if it were no worse; but the same wise man tells us, Eccles. viii. 14, that there he just men, to whom it happens according to the work of the wicked; and there he wicked men, to whom it happens according to the work of the righteous: for a just man, says he, Eccles. vii. 15, many times perisheth in his righteousness, and a wicked man many times prolongs his life in his wickedness. The self-evident truth of these propositions cannot be questioned by any man (though they were not in holy writ) that sees and observes the dispensation of good and bad things in this life. To conclude; we see that riches, honour, pleasure, and whatsoever the foolish world calls good, they are for the most part and in the greatest measure the portion of the worst of men; whereas poverty, pain, and shame, and whatever else we usually term evil, are for the most part and in the highest degree the lot of the righteous; Dives being a type, as it were, of the one, and Lazarus of the other. There must therefore, in all reason and equity, be another audit, or time of account after this life, to the end that, as Abraham said unto Dives, those that have received good things in this life, and been evil, may be tormented; and those that have received evil things in this life, and been good, may be comforted; for if in this life only good men had hope in Christ, they were (as the apostle tells us, 1 Cor. xv. 19) of all men most miserable. This argument, drawn from the seeming unequal distribution of things here below, I mean the calamity of good men, and the prosperity of bad men in this life, is urged by the elder Pliny, and some few others of the heathen moralists, to prove the nonexistence of a God: for if, say they, there be a God, he must needs be just and good; and if he be just and good, he would not, he could not suffer good men to be unrewarded, and evil men unpunished; much less could he or would he endure, that evil men should thrive in and by their wicked courses, and good men fare the worse for their goodness, as in common experience we see they do. And truly if my conclusion concerning the certainty of a judgment to come after this life were not true, this argument of theirs would shrewdly shake the first article and foundation of all our creed, viz. the being of a God. But supposing such a judgment to come, wherein all good men shall finally and fully be rewarded, and all wicked men finally and fully punished, we do at once vindicate the power, the wisdom, the providence, the justice, and consequently the very being and essence of God, from all blasphemy and contradiction, notwithstanding any disproportion or incongruity whatever, that is or seems to be between actions and events, merits and rewards, men’s parts and their fortunes, here in this life. And this is the fourth reason, why, granting there is a God, we must necessarily grant likewise, that there shall be a day of judgment.

5thly, The last reason I shall make use of, to necessitate the evidence and enforce the truth of the doctrine of a future judgment, is that inborn and inbred notion and apprehension, which all men have by nature, that there is such a thing, together with the general expectation of all men, that there will be such a thing: and this reason, how slight soever it may appear to others, to me it seems (what I hope I shall make it seem to you also) most effectual and convincing; for whatsoever it is that all men think will be, without doubt it shall be, because whatsoever all men agree in, is the voice of nature itself, and consequently must be true: for the dictates of nature are stronger than the probats of reason, I mean of reason not abstracted, but as it is in us mortals; and therefore of all other arguments, that which is drawn from natural impression and instinct is most forcible and concluding, and the knowledge arising from such impression or instinct, though it be not so full and perfect, yet it is more certain and infallible than any other knowledge whatsoever, arising from a man’s own fallible discourse and reasoning. I confess indeed that knowledge, the produce of instinct and natural impression only, is not so full, so perfect, nor perhaps so properly termed knowledge, (because the word scire properly denotes per causas scire,) as that which is concluded by demonstration, or drawn from an evident connection of one thing with another, or a consequence of one thing from another; because when a man knows any thing by natural impression or instinct only, he knows not the reasons of what he knows; he knows ὅτι ἔστι, that there is such a thing, but not διότι ἔστι, why it is; no, nor perhaps τὶ ἔστι, what it is; I mean not what it is in the exact or distinct nature of it neither; and yet for all that, this knowledge is (as far as it reaches) more certain and infallible than any conclusion drawn from our own reasoning and discourse can be. 1st, Because this inbred notion, or this knowledge which we have of any thing by natural impression or instinct, is not (as all other human or acquired knowledge is) a conclusion made by us from our own discourse and judgment, which is always fallible, or subject unto error; but it is a conclusion made in us by nature, or rather by the God of nature himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; and therefore whatsoever we know in this manner, must needs be certain.

2dly, Because if the knowledge we have by our instinct were not certain or infallible, this received, and as yet undoubted maxim both in natural philosophy and divinity, viz. That God and nature do nothing in vain, would not be true: for if that were not so indeed, which all men in general, and every man in particular is naturally inclined to believe to be so; then that natural impression or instinct, whereby they are inclined to think so, should be planted in them to no purpose; the affirmation of which is not only a reproach in nature, but a blasphemy against God himself; because indeed that which we call nature is but God’s ordinary method of working in and by the creature.

3dly, That the knowledge which is an effect of natural impression or instinct is indeed certain and infallible, will easily and clearly appear, if we but consider those creatures who have not the use of reason, or of instruction, of revelation, of tradition, or of any other means of knowledge, (excepting that of sense) but this of instinct or natural impression only; and yet we see, that those irrational creatures have their knowledge more immediately, more certainly, and more infallibly, than any man’s deductions from his own discourse and reason. For instance, who amongst us is there that doth or can know his enemy (after the clearest discovery he can make of him) so certainly, or avoid him so suddenly, as the lark doth the hobby at the first sight? What sick man, nay, what physician, knows his own disease, and the remedy for it so exactly, as the dog knows his vomit, and that which will procure it? What husbandman knows his seasons more exactly, or observes them more duly or punctually, than the stork, the crane, and the swallow? Lastly, (pardon the lowness of the similitude,) what landlord or what tenant foresees the ruin of his own house so certainly, or avoids it so seasonably, as the vermin his inmates? And yet the lark never studied Machiavel, nor the dog Hippocrates, neither were the stork, the crane, or the swallow ever taught by natural philosophy to distinguish seasons; nor the vermin by judicial astrology to foresee casual and contingent events: but it has pleased the all-wise and gracious Creator to supply the defects of reason in these poor helpless animals, with a knowledge which, though it be not so large and perfect, yet it is more certain and infallible, especially in those things that are necessary for the preservation of their existence and species, than any knowledge attainable by men, by disquisition or speculation, because (as I said before) it is a knowledge not gotten by, but infused in them by God and nature, who cannot err; and such a knowledge as this (I mean for the kind of it) is that which all men have of a judgment to come, or of something to be suffered by evil doers after this life; a knowledge, I say, which is planted in them, and not learned by them, but originally in every man, and universally in all men; and whatsoever is so, must needs be taught them by God and nature, and consequently cannot be erroneous or uncertain. It is true indeed, that some particular men, or some particular sort or sect of men, may believe and maintain false and foolish opinions, such as have neither solidity of truth in them, nor reality of object without them: but then such opinions as these had their creation and production at first from some one man’s fancy, and from thence derived by education and tradition, may afterwards infect many; and thus the opinion and practice of idolatry, or the worship of more gods than one, came into the world, and spread itself over most part of mankind, for it was not so from the beginning. But the dictates and impressions of nature do very much differ from conceits or imaginations of fancy, and from traditional errors of custom and education; in the first place, because the dictates and impressions of nature are not only general in most men, but universal in all men; whereas conceits of fancy, and traditional errors of custom or education, flowing from thence, though they may be, and often are consented to, and believed by many, yet none of them ever were or ever will be consented to and believed by all. Thus were the philosophers of old, and thus are the Christians at this day divided into their several sects and heresies.